The world this wiki

The idea of LLM Wiki applied to a year of the Economist. Have an LLM keep a wiki up-to-date about companies, people & countries while reading through all articles of the economist from Q2 2025 until Q2 2026.

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countries|Race to the top

Malaysia

Economy

In 1981 Malaysia still relied heavily on commodity exports—first rubber and tin, industries the British empire had nurtured, and then petroleum, timber and palm oil. It is now a diversified manufacturing hub, with electronics its most important export. GDP per person rose from about $1,900 in 1980 to about $12,500 in 2024.

During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the ringgit plunged and the economy slumped, but Mahathir Mohamad rejected IMF help, imposed capital controls and pegged the currency to the dollar. Malaysia quickly recovered.

Race and religion

The Malaysian constitution insists a Malay must be Muslim. The country has a population of about 30m, of whom 61% are Muslims (mainly ethnic Malays), 23% are of Chinese descent and 7% of Indian descent. In 1980 Malays made up 56% of the population, ethnic Chinese 34% and Indians 9%. A survey in 2023 by Pew found that 86% of Muslims in Malaysia favoured making sharia the law of the land; two-thirds of Muslims who prayed daily said being a Muslim was "very important" for being truly Malaysian. The ethnic-Chinese minority dominated business. Affirmative-action policies favour Malays over the Chinese and Indian minorities, with lavish public funding for favoured Malay businessmen.

In the 1980s, fearing competition for the Malay vote from Islamists, UMNO embarked on an "Islamisation" drive for government and society. Malays in public schools endure hours of religious schooling each week, blending Islamic and Malay identities in ways that have fuelled political Islam.

Malaysia has a dual legal system that formally separates civil courts from sharia ones that handle personal and religious matters concerning Muslims. In practice religious authorities increasingly encroach into the civil space. Tensions are especially visible where Muslim and non-Muslim lives intersect, such as in custody disputes and religious conversions: in May 2025 the court of appeal dismissed an appeal by a man who had converted from Christianity to Islam to marry a Muslim; after the marriage ended he sought to convert back, but the court ruled that sharia judges had jurisdiction. The budget for 2026 allocated a record 2.6bn ringgit ($642m) for "Islamic development"—50 times the 50m ringgit allocated to maintain all non-Muslim places of worship. In August 2025 the state of Terengganu began enforcing a sharia provision imposing a fine of up to 3,000 ringgit ($770) and prison terms of up to two years on Muslim men who miss even a single Friday prayer—not even Iran or Saudi Arabia imprisons prayer-dodgers. The federal department for Islamic development, JAKIM, co-ordinates religious matters nationally.

Social media shape how people understand and practise Islam. TikTok, Instagram and YouTube have become arenas for religious outreach, debate and judgment. TikTok helped PAS expand its vote at the previous election. Celebrity preachers and "micro-dakwah"—short religious videos—are popular trends. Everyday choices can quickly become matters of state concern once amplified online: in January 2026 a Zumba instructor went viral dancing in a headscarf and an outfit that did not cover her knees; the Islamic department in Selangor opened an inquiry into whether she had brought "Islam into disrepute". In 2024 the owner of KK Super Mart was charged with intending to hurt Muslim feelings after socks bearing the word "Allah" appeared at three of its 800 outlets; Malaysia's home ministry had declared in 2013 that the word should be reserved exclusively for Muslims. Homosexuality is a crime punishable by whipping and prison terms of up to 20 years. The attempt to redress imbalances through affirmative action had predictable effects: a culture of corruption and cronyism that thrived long after Mahathir stepped down, culminating in the 1MDB scandal, exposed in 2015, in which billions of dollars were stolen from a sovereign wealth fund by well-connected insiders. Najib Razak is now in jail on related charges.

Politics

The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was the vehicle for Malay political dominance for decades. It suffered its first-ever electoral defeat in 2018, when Mahathir Mohamad led a breakaway party to victory in coalition with his former deputy, Anwar Ibrahim. Mahathir lost power in 2020. Anwar became prime minister in 2022, leading the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition.

PAS and political Islam

PAS, Malaysia's stridently Islamist party, is the largest party in the main opposition bloc, Perikatan Nasional (PN). Despite winning only 15% of the vote, PAS won the most seats of any single party at the 2022 general election; by 2023 it was in control of four states and had become the largest single party in the federal parliament, though still in opposition there. It has long held the rural states of Kelantan and Terengganu; in 2023 it picked up Kedah by a narrow margin. It is also gaining support in urban areas, though it has struggled to make inroads in eastern states like Sarawak and Sabah, where Muslim communities are more ethnically diverse. Some analysts believe PAS has a shot at government at the next general election, due in 2028. Young Malays are turning to PAS: the best estimates suggest about 37% of Malays aged under 30 voted for parties in PAS's coalition in 2022, a smidge higher than for Anwar Ibrahim's PH. According to recent polls, "upholding Islam" is the most important criterion for how young Malays vote. PAS pumps out a prodigious number of political clips on TikTok, where most young Malays get their information. Islam drives political competition in Malaysia: the ruling and opposition parties vie for Malay voters, who make up 60% of the electorate and must under the constitution be, at least nominally, Muslim, and both try to "out-Islamise" each other.

In the 1980s Mahathir weakened key institutions: he confronted the judiciary, the traditional hereditary Malay rulers of nine of the country's states and his political opponents, deploying an Internal Security Act bequeathed by the British to arrest more than 100 politicians, academics, activists and others in 1987.

The MACC

The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has taken some notable scalps: Najib Razak is serving a lengthy prison term following MACC prosecutions related to the 1MDB scandal. But the commission has suffered from a perception that, though nominally independent, it is in fact an attack dog for the government. In 2009 a man being questioned by the MACC was found dead after falling from a 14th-floor window, a death a court blamed in part on MACC officers; two years later a customs officer facing questioning also died from a fall from a MACC window.

Anwar Ibrahim became prime minister in 2022 as a champion of "reformasi" (reform) and a fierce denouncer of corruption, but has three times extended the tenure of Azam Baki, the chief commissioner since 2020, and is accused of using the MACC as a political weapon. Azam Baki is suing Bloomberg for defamation over its report that he owned more shares in a financial-services company than allowed for public officials. Another Bloomberg report accused MACC officials of colluding with businessmen to put pressure on company owners—by holding them for questioning or threatening prosecutions—to oust executives and relinquish control.

Na'imah Khalid, the widow of Daim Zainuddin, a wealthy businessman who served as finance minister under Mahathir Mohamad and who died in 2024, has accused Anwar of riding the "reformasi horse until he became PM, then dismounting and ignoring it." She and four of Daim's children are accused by the MACC of failing to declare all their assets. Her retention of an international strategic consultancy to protect her family's reputation became the subject of a police inquiry into whether she was trying to "topple" the government. Anwar has been accused of hypocrisy: his own party retained an American firm to lobby for his freedom when he was jailed. He insists the cases are different.

FIFA football scandal

In June 2025 the Malaysian national football team defeated Vietnam 4-0, but at least five of its players had become naturalised citizens only a week before the match. None had been born in Malaysia; the Football Association of Malaysia (FAM) claimed each had a grandparent born there. FIFA found Malaysia guilty of forging players' documents—"pure and simple, a form of cheating"—and fined the FAM. A November 2025 FIFA report revealed that one player's grandmother was born not in Johor, as FAM asserted, but in Minas Gerais, Brazil. The players, who knew little about the papers they signed (largely because they were in Malay), were suspended for a year. The government's sports ministry froze new funding for FAM. Five players were issued passports the day they applied, a fact seized on by activists highlighting that around 120,000 stateless people born and raised in Malaysia face a far longer path to citizenship.

Agriculture

The average farmer in Malaysia is 60 years old. The government launched new grants in January 2026 for young agricultural entrepreneurs, part of a broader effort across South-East Asia to address the greying of the farm workforce. Taking South-East Asia as a whole, a third of all farm workers are 55 or older—up from less than a fifth a decade ago. Agriculture in the region supplies 9-22% of GDP, depending on the country, and employs roughly 30% of workers.

Gig economy

Roughly 1.2m Malaysians, about 7% of the labour force, work in the gig economy, on platforms and off.

AI and data centres

Johor, the Malaysian state that borders Singapore, has become the world's second-largest AI hub, according to SemiAnalysis. The partnership between Oracle and Bytedance has been a key driver: Bytedance will invest $2.7bn in Malaysia while Oracle plans to invest over $6.5bn. Most of Oracle's GPU capacity in the region goes to Bytedance. The data centres run on chips supplied by Nvidia. Microsoft has pledged $4bn in Malaysia and Indonesia; Alphabet is building a $2bn data centre in Malaysia.

Huawei and Alibaba have built data centres across South-East Asia. Huawei has begun selling its Ascend AI chips, an alternative to Nvidia's semiconductors, in the Middle East and the region.

On July 14th 2025 Malaysia announced that all exports, trans-shipments and transits of advanced AI chips would require a trade permit, with 30 days' notice required. This followed American pressure to stop chips subject to export controls reaching China via Malaysia.

Trade and "China plus one"

Malaysia is well positioned as a "China plus one" manufacturing location. The effective American tariff rate applied to Malaysia has risen from under 1% before Trump's tariffs to a comparatively modest 12%, while the China-Malaysia effective-tariff differential has shot up from ten to 30 percentage points. In 2024 Malaysia sent 13% of its exports to America, up from 9% before Trump's first trade war. Under President Biden, America targeted Malaysia's solar-panel industry for facilitating Chinese tariff-dodging. Malaysia's limited reliance on American demand (less than a fifth of exports), relatively low transshipment exposure and favourable tariff differentials make it one of the best-placed countries in the region under the current trade regime.

Malaysia concluded a final reciprocal trade deal with Trump, receiving a reciprocal tariff rate of 19% with exemptions for many exports. Lacking leverage, it offered sweeping concessions, including agreeing to mirror American export controls against China, consulting America before signing digital-trade deals and accepting that America can terminate the pact if Malaysia strikes another deal it dislikes. One former Malaysian politician called it "the worst agreement" Malaysia has entered since independence in 1957; even the current trade minister spoke of "unfair" clauses.

Penang and semiconductors

Penang, a Malaysian island, was once a twin city of Singapore, both built to British plans as free ports in the early 19th century. After the second world war the British legally bound it to the states of the Malay Peninsula. After independence in 1957 the national government stripped it of its free-port status a decade later.

Penang's leaders followed Singapore down the path of recruiting early semiconductor firms. A single Intel facility became a hub of activity. Today Penang attracts on average a third of Malaysia's foreign direct investment and produces a third of Malaysia's exports, at $117bn in 2024. Penang's niche is cutting wafers made elsewhere into hundreds or thousands of smaller pieces before assembling them into integrated circuits; only China and Taiwan do more of this sort of business.

As the chip war between America and China heats up, Penang is poised to benefit. The state government is planning to double the area dedicated to semiconductors by reclaiming land, shipping in more electricity from the mainland and freeing up water. American firms are pledging over $8bn in new investment, while Chinese suppliers are moving manufacturing to the island to continue selling to American firms.

Penang faces a brain drain, with Singapore paying better and offering superior infrastructure. A bigger problem is the national government's affirmative-action policies favouring the Malay majority. At independence Penang's population was 57% ethnic Chinese; now it is 44%. Anwar Ibrahim, a native of Penang, campaigned against these quotas in opposition but now says they will not change any time soon.

The national government has also sought to push part of the country's chips business farther down the peninsula, diluting the cluster around Penang. In March 2025 the economy minister inked a $250m deal with Arm Holdings, a British firm, to get access to its most advanced chip designs, with the minister deciding which firms get to work with them.

Non-Reciprocal Laws of Expectations: Negative expectations yield negative results. Positive expectations yield negative results.