American private-credit firm focused on tech, which grew from $50bn of assets under management in 2021 to more than $300bn by early 2026. In February 2026 Blue Owl halted planned withdrawals from OBDC II, a retail fund with assets of $1.6bn, choosing instead to sell assets and return capital to all investors. The fund had used a model popularised by Blackstone's Real Estate Income Trust, which offers limited liquidity: investors can request redemptions each month or quarter, but the fund processes total redemptions worth up to only 5% of its net asset value each quarter; requests exceeding that figure are capped and granted pro rata.
Mohamed El-Erian, an investor, pondered whether Blue Owl's troubles were a dead coalmine canary or something worse—like termites, indicating deep structural problems in private credit. The news sent shockwaves through the industry, with listed private-investment managers shedding tens of billions in market value. OBDC II cast doubt on the model that firms such as Apollo, Blackstone and KKR—which collectively oversee $3trn in assets, up from $200bn in 2008—had hoped would "democratise" private investment by enticing retail savers into unlisted assets.
After further redemption surges in 2026, Blue Owl capped withdrawals at 5% for two more funds and appeared to be winding down another. Shares in the asset manager lost two-thirds of their value from their early-2025 peak. It is also a big lender to data-centre projects. Cox Capital Partners, a secondaries-investment firm, has offered to buy out (at a discount) investors in OBDC II.
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