The world this wiki

The idea of LLM Wiki applied to a year of the Economist. Have an LLM keep a wiki up-to-date about companies, people & countries while reading through all articles of the economist from Q2 2025 until Q2 2026.

DOsinga/the_world_this_wiki

topics|Ore struck

Critical minerals

Critical minerals are a category of 30 to 60 metals deemed vital to computing, electrification, aerospace and defence. The United States Geological Survey lists 60 as critical; the category lumps together common metals such as copper (29m tonnes produced in 2025) with niche ones such as "heavy" rare earths produced in the tens of tonnes annually. China is the biggest miner, and by far the dominant refiner, of many of them. It mines about 80% of the world's tungsten and refines 99% of its gallium.

Africa

The estimated worth of undeveloped mineral assets in Africa is $8.6trn, three times the continent's GDP. America is trying to loosen China's stranglehold on various critical minerals partly through investment in African mining.

America's state-sponsored mining campaign

The Trump administration launched what amounts to centrally planned intervention in the mining industry, the most ambitious since the early cold war. After China restricted exports of seven rare earths in April 2025, causing supply-chain disruptions for F-35 jets, missiles, drones, radars and electric motors—and targeted another five in October, the administration decided to emulate what it sees as the recipe for China's supremacy: heavy-handed intervention in commodity markets. The campaign is co-ordinated by David Copley, a former gold miner on America's National Security Council.

The administration has signed mineral-themed partnerships with more than 20 countries from Argentina to Uzbekistan. Every big geopolitical pivot—in Ukraine, Venezuela, Greenland—has been partly justified by mineral riches.

Subsidies and investment

The administration is subsidising upfront costs of new mines through loans and direct investment, drawing on a jumble of institutions. Since October the Pentagon has committed $2.8bn in equity and debt to eight mining and refining projects, biased towards metals such as gallium and germanium. EXIM, the Export-Import Bank, has issued $15bn in letters of interest for critical-mineral projects, including $455m for a rare-earth venture in America and $350m for cobalt and nickel in Australia. The Department of Energy has approved $7bn in loans to domestic ventures in graphite, lithium and potash. The DFC has deployed equity and debt "in the world's most strategic regions", providing seed funding for minerals in Ukraine and a third of the $1.8bn Orion CMC is injecting into Congo, and is mulling a $700m investment in Kazakh tungsten mines.

The administration has signed 21 bilateral pacts with foreign governments and concluded negotiations for 17 more, giving American firms first dibs on mining investments abroad. In some cases financing comes with a condition that little or none of the output be sold to China. In Africa, aid is being linked to governments agreeing to mining deals.

Project Vault

Project Vault is a proposed national civilian stockpile of all 60 critical minerals, inspired by America's 50-year-old, 415m-barrel Strategic Petroleum Reserve. It is to be financed by a $10bn loan from EXIM and $2bn in private capital. A select group of commodities traders would buy metals; companies would pay fees up front and commit to purchasing at a set price, then be granted access to the stockpile when crisis strikes. The goal is to cover weeks or months of demand for various metals, and up to a year's supply for some like yttrium. More than a dozen firms—including General Motors, Boeing, Google and GE Vernova—have indicated willingness to join.

Critics note that unlike the oil reserve, which involves a single commodity refinable at home, hoarding metals is far more complicated. Storing ores requires lots of space and serves little purpose without domestic refiners. Refined metals are less bulky but less fungible.

Price floors

In July 2025 the administration entered its first price-floor scheme with MP Materials, setting a ten-year floor on the price of neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) oxide at $110 a kilogram. If MP sells below that price, the Pentagon pays the difference. The Pentagon has also committed to buy all the rare-earth magnets MP produces at a planned new facility for the first ten years. MP's average NdPr price in the three months to September (before the floor took effect) was $59/kg; NdPr leaving China fetched $78/kg over the same period.

Minerals club

In February 2026 the State Department hosted a "Mineral Ministerial" in Washington, attended by 54 countries (China was not invited). America proposed a "minerals club" that would set price floors for transactions within the bloc; a kitty funded by member countries would pay producers the difference when transactions settle below the floor. Imports from outside the club would face a tariff bringing the cost up to the floor. The administration gave roughly 30 countries until March to return letters of commitment. Jamieson Greer, America's trade representative, told The Economist: "I'd rather get inefficient production from a bunch of market economies I'm generally aligned with than efficient production from a country I'm not strategically aligned with."

Scepticism

Many experts worry the approach is scattershot rather than focused on the most critical minerals. Individual project sums, though large in aggregate, can be tiny: most EXIM cheques are for millions or tens of millions of dollars—a rounding error for mines that can cost billions. Most raw metals produced by the proposed club would still need to be sent to China for refining, so there is no escape from Chinese leverage. Markets are sceptical: metals prices have barely twitched. Chinese mining firms are continuing to acquire assets abroad.

Allied efforts

The EU has set targets for reducing Chinese imports and speeding up permitting but committed relatively little money—€3bn across 34 minerals. Australia and Canada are spending somewhat more, but mostly at home. Japan is the most active ally; JOGMEC, its resource-security agency, is "aggressively" investing and taking "much more risk", though Japanese officials oppose price floors, arguing that free markets are a necessary condition for long-run success. Japan suffered from Chinese manipulation of metals markets in 2010, when China imposed an unofficial ban on rare-earth exports to Japan during a row over disputed islands. Japan responded by taking minority stakes in foreign mines and greatly expanding its critical-metals stockpile.

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