An Iranian-backed Shia militia based in Yemen that has been attacking shipping in the Red Sea. The Bab al-Mandab strait, which they menace, used to carry 9% of world trade but carried only 4% as of early 2026 owing to Houthi attacks from 2023 onwards. Led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, with Muhammad Abdulsalam as chief negotiator, the group seized Yemen's capital Sana'a in 2014 and has withstood a decade of bombardment from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others. Its force has grown 12-fold to 350,000 since 2015, according to the UN. Unlike their Yemeni opponents, the Houthis are disciplined and battle-ready. The leaders of Hamas and Hizbullah have fallen; Abdul-Malik al-Houthi is the last man standing among Iran's "axis of resistance".
In May 2025 Donald Trump paused the American bombing campaign after seven weeks and over a thousand strikes costing an estimated $1bn, announcing a deal brokered by Oman's foreign minister Badr Albusaidi in which the Houthis would cease attacks on commercial shipping. The deal does not constrain Houthi strikes against Israel; the group says it will continue firing at Israel as long as it maintains its blockade of Gaza. Israel's government was not notified of the deal in advance.
The Houthis are bolstering ties with al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, providing arms and training. They can strike America's bases in Djibouti, according to the head of US Africa Command.
Exactly two months after Trump's ceasefire, the Houthis resumed attacks. In July 2025 they boarded the Magic Seas, a bulk carrier, and rigged it with explosives. They also attacked the Eternity C, which had just completed a humanitarian delivery for the World Food Programme, with naval drones and rocket-propelled grenades; it sank, killing or leaving missing nine of its 25 sailors. Red Sea traffic was roughly 50% lower than before the attacks began, according to Lloyd's List. The Houthis still have ample smuggling routes from Iran, which delivers arms by sea or overland through Oman.
In November 2025 the Houthis formally ended their two-year campaign against Western-aligned vessels in the Red Sea. Even so, as of early 2026 half as many oil tankers—and virtually no LNG tankers—were risking the passage as in 2023, before the attacks began.
During the third Gulf war the Houthis held off shooting missiles at tankers in the Red Sea, allowing some Saudi oil—pumped to the coast and bypassing the Strait of Hormuz—to reach world markets and helping to keep a lid on global oil prices. The Houthis may now be incentivised to demand a high price for their restraint, such as international recognition of their control over northern Yemen.
On March 27th 2026 the Houthis launched their first missile towards Israel since the start of the Gulf war, marking the opening of a potential new front. More missiles followed. The Houthis have so far stopped short of using their most potent lever: their ability to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia is exporting 5m barrels per day through its Red Sea terminal at Yanbu, up from 1.6m b/d before the war started. Were the Houthis to block this artery while the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, some analysts reckon oil could jump to close to $200 a barrel.
The Houthis have reinforced positions along the Red Sea coast between the ports of Hajja and Hodeida and along their border with Saudi Arabia, deploying anti-ship missile batteries, naval sabotage teams, explosive-boat infrastructure, sea-mines and maritime-drone launch sites. Three factors are drawing them in: Iran's attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure are dragging the region into the fray; America's dispatch of more soldiers, including the USS Abraham Lincoln, has changed their threat perception; and their economy is desperate—civil servants have gone unpaid for months and some 18m Yemenis, most of them in the Houthis' zone, face acute hunger.
By late 2025 the Houthis were struggling with a financial crisis. Israeli strikes had damaged ports, cement factories and other businesses that generated revenue. American sanctions cut off financial flows. The group still has illicit sources of revenue, from drug-trafficking to cryptocurrency schemes, but it is clearly squeezed: some months it pays partial salaries; other months, nothing at all. Wadhah al-Awlaqi of the Sana'a Centre for Strategic Studies estimated that food and fuel imports in Houthi-controlled areas were down by 20% and 27% respectively up to August 2025, compared with the same period the previous year.
A peace deal under discussion with Saudi Arabia would commit the kingdom temporarily to pay public-sector salaries in Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthis sharpened their rhetoric against the kingdom in late 2025, with Abdel-Malik al-Houthi accusing it of being in league with Israel. Propagandists warned of renewed cross-border attacks if the Saudis did not lift their "economic strangulation" of Yemen. A UN-brokered ceasefire between the kingdom and the Houthis has largely held since 2022: the militia has not attacked Saudi cities since then.
Pity the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.